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Layering Law upon Custom:  
The British in Colonial West India 
James A. Jaffe* 
The panchayat, or customary village council, holds an iconic place in 
Indian social and political ideology.  Largely due to the influence of 
Mahatma Gandhi, the panchayat came to possess almost mythic standing as 
an indigenous democratic institution that could form the basis for an 
authentically Indian democracy.  Gandhi’s imagining of the panchayat, 
however, was only one of many that circulated among Indian nationalists at 
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.  Few, 
if any, of the most prominent nationalist leaders ever had actually seen a 
functioning village council.  Indeed, by the time of the nationalist 
movement, the panchayat, as an institution to order village affairs, had 
become largely moribund, although caste panchayats often continued to 
regulate the norms and practices of separate castes.1  Nevertheless, the 
resurrection of the all-village panchayat became one of the essential 
unifying elements of the movement to create a truly national identity.2 
A significant portion of the explanation for the survival of the 
panchayat ideal lies with the British idealization of the institution.  Twice 
during the nineteenth century, British administrators in India “discovered,” 
romanticized, and attempted to institute a form of panchayati raj, or rule by 
panchayat.  The first discovery, which will be the focus of this essay, dates 
to approximately the first third of the nineteenth century, when several 
prominent East India Company military officers sought to adapt the 
panchayat to the needs of the British administration of justice, especially in 
the newly-conquered regions of southern and western India.  To meet these 
requirements, the panchayat was put forth as an Indian analog of both the 
English jury and European tribunals of arbitration.  The second “discovery” 
dates to the final third of the nineteenth century.  At that time, the 
necessities of urban and rural development required new forms of local and 
municipal administration.  The consequent widespread support among 
British administrators in India for political decentralization was expressed 
in the form of a new desire to recreate the panchayat, but this time as a 
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1 JOHN MATTHAI, VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN BRITISH INDIA 181 (1915).   
2 C.A. BAYLY, RECOVERING LIBERTIES: INDIAN THOUGHT IN THE AGE OF LIBERALISM AND 
EMPIRE 279-90, 347 (2012). 
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municipal body in the image of European local administration.  Both times, 
it should be noted, the panchayat appeared as an instrument of colonial rule 
in a form created to meet the demands of British governance and fashioned 
by contemporary streams of Western political theory. 
The first iteration of the panchayat as a judicial institution was largely 
the work of two officer-officials of the East India Company, Thomas 
Munro and Mountstuart Elphinstone.  Most British officer-officials had 
active experience with the panchayat since the British Articles of War 
allowed the panchayat to be used both as an arbitral institution to resolve 
monetary disputes between soldiers and camp followers and for the court-
martial of sepoy (Indian) troops.3  However, Munro imagined the panchayat 
as much more than that.  For him, the panchayat was analogous to the 
British common law jury and, moreover, was evidence that India possessed 
its own common law tradition.  In a quote often repeated by East India 
Company officials in London, Munro had reported that “there can be no 
doubt that the trial by Punchayet is as much the common law of India in 
civil matters, as that by Jury is of England.”4 
While Munro worked to consolidate the Company’s holdings in 
southern India, his fellow officer, Elphinstone, did the same in the West.5  
At the end of the Third Anglo-Maratha War in 1818, the Company had 
come to occupy an area of approximately 50,000 square miles containing 
about 4,000,000 inhabitants in India’s western Deccan.  While Elphinstone 
shared Munro’s idealization of the panchayat, the two differed sharply over 
its functions in practice.  For Elphinstone, the panchayat was indeed an 
aspect of India’s common law, but it functioned less as an analog of the 
English jury system and much more as an analog of an English tribunal of 
arbitration. 
Elphinstone’s determination to resurrect panchayat justice in the 
western Deccan of the Bombay Presidency was certainly among the most 
 
3 See WILLIAM HOUGH & GEORGE LONG, THE PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL, ALSO THE 
LEGAL EXPOSITION AND MILITARY EXPLANATION OF THE MUTINY ACT, AND ARTICLES OF WAR 369-70 
(London, Kingsbury, Parbury, & Allen 2d ed. 1825) (Regulation II, enacted 1809); id. at 595-96 
(Regulation XX, enacted 1810). 
4 Thomas Munro, Report of the Collector of the Ceded Districts 15th August 1807, on the 
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Zemindary Permanent Settlements and of the Ryotwar 
Settlements, in PAPERS CONCERNING REVENUE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL MATTERS IN INDIA 
292-97, IOR/H/686 (1807) (on file with the British Library). 
5 See generally KENNETH BALLHATCHET, SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WESTERN 
INDIA, 1817-1830 (1957); T.H. BEAGLEHOLE, THOMAS MUNRO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY IN MADRAS, 1792-1818 (1966); MEERA SINGH, BRITISH REVENUE AND 
JUDICIAL POLICIES IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY OF DECCAN, 1818-1826 (1994); BURTON STEIN, THOMAS 
MUNRO: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLONIAL STATE AND HIS VISION OF EMPIRE (1989); Catherine S. 
Meschievitz, Civil Litigation and Judicial Policy in the Madras Presidency, 1800-1843 (1986) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with Law Library, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison). 
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significant attempts to incorporate customary Indian systems of justice into 
the British judicial system.  Not only did Elphinstone and his officers 
engage in substantive historical and contemporary research on the 
panchayat’s activities under the Maratha Peshwa, or Prime Minister, but 
they also took a very active role in supervising and promoting its use under 
their own administration.  By adapting the panchayat to British needs, most 
officer-officials believed that they were reviving an ancient and customary 
institution that would be welcomed by the people of the country.  At the 
same time, they also believed that the panchayat had to be reformed and re-
structured to meet the British government’s present-day needs.  The 
paradox of attempting to achieve both of these goals did not occur to them.  
Perhaps the ultimate failure of British attempts to revive the panchayat 
during this era was therefore inevitable. 
Elphinstone had first come to India in 1796.6  For many years, he 
served at Pune conducting diplomatic relations with the Maratha Peshwa.  
However, after the British victory in the Third Anglo-Maratha War, 
Elphinstone was given responsibility to occupy and settle the Deccan, 
which the Peshwa had been forced to cede to the British.  In 1819, 
Elphinstone was appointed governor of the Bombay Presidency, a position 
he would hold until 1827.  Upon the British occupation of the Deccan, the 
Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India, permitted Elphinstone “to 
establish such temporary measures as he might deem requisite or proper, 
and to avail himself of the talents and experience of Brigadier-General 
Munro, by inviting assistance from the latter in introducing the British 
authority into the southern territory.”7  However, Hastings also ordered that 
these temporary measures “were limited to the restoration of [civil 
administration] as nearly as might be practicable, to the character of its 
original institutions.”8  Elphinstone dutifully followed these orders.  In 
1818, he ordered his subordinate Collectors to “scrupulously avoid all sorts 
of innovations” in order “to show the people that they are to expect no 
change but in the better administration of their former laws.”9  Therefore, 
British Collectors, who were responsible for the general administration of 
individual districts, were to employ former Maratha officials and to 
maintain the system whereby the Patails might settle village disputes by 
 
6 C.A. Bayly, Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1779-1859), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL 
BIOGRAPHY (David Cannadine ed., online ed. 2008), available at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/
article/8752 (last visited May 25, 2011). 
7 Letter from the Marquis of Hastings to the Secret Committee (Aug. 21, 1820), in PAPERS 
RESPECTING THE PINDARRY AND MAHRATTA WARS 416, 422 (London, J.L. Cox 1824). 
8 Similar instructions were issued for the settlement of Nagpur, Pune, and the North-West 
Provinces. See id. at 439, 445. 
9 Letter from Mountstuart Elphinstone to the Marquis of Hastings (June 18, 1818), in POONA 
AFFAIRS (ELPHINSTONE’S EMBASSY), PART II, 1816-18, at 408 (G.S. Sardesai ed., 1950). 
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village Punchayets (arbitration).  The Mamlutdars would superintend the 
trial of more important causes by Punchayets of the most respectable people 
within their divisions, while those of greater magnitude and all appeals 
would come before the Collector himself assisted also by Punchayets and 
Hindoo Lawyers.10 
Both East India Company officials in London and Elphinstone himself 
made it clear, however, that this was only to be a temporary measure until 
the territory was settled; further improvements would then be made.  For his 
part, Elphinstone appeared somewhat confident that relatively few 
substantive reforms would be needed in the future.  He wrote, 
[t]he present system is probably not bad in itself as the country has 
prospered under it notwithstanding the feebleness and corruption 
which it was administered.  At all events it is generally known and 
understood; it suits the people whom indeed it has helped form, and it 
is probably capable of being made tolerably perfect by gradual 
improvements introduced as they appear to be called for.11 
John Adam, Hastings’s Chief Secretary, however, was not as sanguine 
and suggested that significant reforms would eventually be forthcoming.  
“Such a system [of the panchayat],” he noted, “while it not only secures in 
the most satisfactory manner of which present circumstances admit, the 
ends of essential equity, will form the best possible basis for such future 
ameliorations as the superior integrity and intelligence of the British Agents 
may enable them to introduce.”12 
By the following year, 1819, Elphinstone, then serving as 
Commissioner of the Deccan, had become convinced that in the 
administration of civil law “our principal instrument must continue to be the 
Punchayet” and that the panchayat was “the great instrument in the 
administration of Justice.”13  It is not exactly clear why or when his 
previously qualified support had given way to such a vigorous endorsement 
of the panchayat.  Munro’s influence may very well have been of great 
importance, but, as noted above, the two did not share the same 
understanding or interpretation of the function of the panchayat.  Whereas 
Munro believed that the panchayat was analogous to the English jury, 
 
10 Id. at 410. 
11 Id. 
12 Letter from John Adam to Mountstuart Elphinstone (Sept. 26, 1818), in POONA AFFAIRS 
(ELPHINSTONE’S EMBASSY), PART II, 1816-1818, at 478 (G.S. Sardesai ed., 1950). 
13 MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, REPORT ON THE TERRITORIES CONQUERED FROM THE 
PAISHWA 78, 99 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) (1821). An initial version of the Report was completed 
in October 1819 and circulated to Elphinstone’s Collectors. Circular of the Honble the Commissioner to 
the Collectors in the Newly Acquired Territories from the Late Paishwa (Oct. 25, 1819), in BOMBAY 
PROCEEDINGS 1820-1829, IOR/P/398/71 (1820) (British Library).  
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Elphinstone thought it much more akin to a board or tribunal of arbitration. 
In English practice and in English law, these were obviously significantly 
different institutions with significantly different legal authority.  Perhaps of 
greatest significance was the fact that, in England, arbitration was a wholly 
voluntary process. Further, arbitration suits were pursued largely beyond 
the purview of the courts; decisions were based upon equity and not 
precedent; the process was free of pleadings, fees, and lawyers; and an 
arbitration tribunal lacked any means of enforcing its award.  These 
qualities obviously would not apply if the panchayat were deemed a “native 
jury.” 
Nevertheless, as Commissioner of the Deccan, Elphinstone quickly 
began to make significant inquiries into the jurisdiction and procedures of 
panchayats.  His roughly-penciled notes indicate what he understood to be 
some of its principal advantages: 
      Old appeals says Gen Munro were always [stated?] to be made 
because [there?] had been no Punchayet or because the cause was tried 
before a [illegible] officer[.]  The natives have no confidence in any 
plan but punchayets. 
   The Ct. attribute the success of the best Collectors to their leaving 
the detailed management of affairs to the natives according to the 
existing [?] forms & usages of the Country & to see they do their duty 
instead of attempting to do it for them. 
   Complaints to be made to Assistants or referred to them by the 
Courts either party may demand a Punchayet . . . . 
   Punchayets on revenue suits particularly recommended by the 
Fortescue.14 
As early as December 1817, a circular had been sent to the various 
judicial officers in the Presidency inquiring whether the panchayat system 
could be adapted there as it had been in Madras under Munro.15  The 
response from the judges was noticeably mixed.  Much of the muddle was 
apparently caused by the confusion between their perception of the 
panchayat as an arbitration tribunal or the panchayat as a jury trial.  Thus, 
Saville Marriott, the Collector of the Northern Konkan, described the 
panchayat as a “mode of trial,” while S. Babington, the Judge and 
Magistrate at Tannah, assumed that judgment by the panchayat was “the 
judgment of arbitrators.”16  Elphinstone also circulated to his principal 
 
14 Mountstuart Elphinstone, Notes, in PAPERS OF MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE ON THE POWER 
OF THE PATELS AND PUNCHAYETS, ETC. 63-65, Mss Eur F88/408 (1819) (British Library) (emphasis in 
original). 
15 Bombay Judicial Proceedings (Dec. 27, 1817), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: PROCEEDINGS AND 
CONSULTATIONS 1702-1945, IOR/P/398/69 (British Library). 
16 Bombay Judicial Proceedings, supra note 15, at 160-61, 168-69. 
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subordinates questionnaires on the Peshwa’s administration of law in the 
territories.  These were quite lengthy, comprising well over a hundred 
questions, many of which related in some way or other to the form and 
function of panchayats.17  The responses provided to Elphinstone thus 
provide a contemporary account of how British officer-officials first 
understood the work of the panchayat as well as the processes involved in 
securing panchayat justice.  Significantly, the responses to this 
questionnaire did not always coincide with one another.  It is difficult to 
ascertain whether the discrepancies indicate local differences in the 
functioning of the panchayat or whether the officer-officials themselves 
misapprehended the processes involved.  Nevertheless, when taken 
together, the officer-officials’ responses provide a unique view of how the 
British came to understand the panchayat system in the Deccan when they 
first sought to adapt it for their purposes.  At the very least, the responses’ 
importance lies in the fact that the British administration of justice in the 
region would be substantially based upon these initial perceptions and 
misperceptions for the next two decades. 
Four of the five principal regional officer-officials under Elphinstone 
provided written answers to the questionnaire: Captain Henry Pottinger, 
Collector in Ahmednagar; Captain John Briggs, Political Agent in 
Khandesh; Captain James Grant, Resident at Satara; and William Chaplin, 
the only civilian, Collector at Dharwar and soon-to-be Commissioner of the 
Deccan.  The fifth, Captain H.D. Robertson, the Collector of Pune, may 
very well have been in personal contact with Elphinstone.  There was 
universal agreement among them that the panchayat decided local disputes 
that could not be resolved through the personal intervention of the village 
headman (patel).  Pottinger explained, for example, that a panchayat was 
convened to settle disputes only after “amicable arbitration” had failed.18  
The respondents also agreed that the authority to convene a panchayat lay 
exclusively with the patel.  Hence, they argued, the revival of the ancient 
panchayat to a great extent depended upon maintaining the patel’s 
authority.  Together, an active patel and an effective panchayat constituted 
the essential administrative foundation for Elphinstone’s ryotwari system of 
revenue collection and peasant proprietorship in the Presidency.19 
The patels were, as Elphinstone put it, “the most important 
 
17 Different selections from the questionnaire and the response are reproduced in H. GEORGE 
FRANKS, PANCHAYETS UNDER THE PESHWAS, 77-80, App. No. 1 (Poona Star Press ed., 1930) and R. D. 
CHOKSEY, TWILIGHT OF THE MARATHA RAJ, 1818, at viii-xii (R.D. Choksey ed., 1976).  Both books are 
based on the Poona Residency Daftar in the Pune Archives. Franks, in particular, provides a reliable, 
albeit dated, guide to the panchayat system as it was being adapted by the British. 
18 Choksey, supra note 17, at 61. 
19 The various later interpretations of the “sociological” connection between the panchayat and 
the land revenue system are analyzed in RONALD INDEN, IMAGINING INDIA (1990). 
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functionaries in the villages, and perhaps the most important class in the 
country.”20  Not only was the patel responsible for the administration of 
justice through both his personal arbitration of disputes and the convening 
of panchayats, but he also was head of the village police and watchmen.  
Moreover, he was responsible for the collection of the revenue and 
essentially functioned as the representative of the village’s needs and 
interests.  Therefore, as Elphinstone realized, the patel was a critical 
intermediary: he was both an agent of government and a representative of 
the people.  The patel, he wrote, “is not less useful in executing the order of 
the Government, than in asserting the rights, or at least making known the 
wrongs, of the people.”21 
While the patel possessed the authority to convene a panchayat, there 
were various explanations as to how the panchayat process might be 
initiated.  According to Pottinger, a panchayat could be “demanded” by the 
litigants, after which the patel “gave his permission to one being 
assembled.”  Grant, however, simply indicated that the patel “had [the] 
power to call a Punchayet or not as he judged proper.”22  In Briggs’s report 
from Khandesh, a third possibility was described in which the parties 
themselves took their dispute “to the patails and elders of the village when 
they sat as is customary under some large tree at the village gate of an 
evening.”23 
There was, however, fundamental agreement that panchayats were a 
voluntary mode of settlement and that litigants could not be compelled to 
accept their intervention in disputes.  Thus Elphinstone’s Report on the 
Territories Conquered from the Paishwa described Maratha practice as 
follows: “the Patail assembled a Punchayet of inhabitants of the Village, 
who enquired into the matter with very little form, and decided as they 
thought best; but their decision could not take place without the previous 
consent of the parties.”24  As Captain Briggs later wrote, “It is one of the 
invariable rules of the Punchayut as it was originally instituted for the 
object of doing Justice, not to enter upon business without having the 
consent of both parties to abide by their judgement.”25  In this respect, the 
panchayat was often compared to the system of English arbitration, and 
members of panchayats often were referred to in Company accounts as 
arbitrators. 
 
20 Elphinstone, supra note 13, at 21. 
21 Id. at 22. 
22 Choksey, supra note 17, at 61. 
23 Id. at 64. 
24 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 57. 
25 Bombay Judicial Consultations, Briggs to Chaplin (May 31, 1822), in INDIA OFFICE 
RECORDS: BOMBAY PROCEEDINGS 1823-1830, IOR/P/399/23 (British Library). 
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Once a panchayat was called, the process of selecting its members was 
of paramount importance.  Chaplin and Pottinger agreed that the parties 
themselves were allowed to choose their own representatives to serve on the 
tribunal.26  There were no prerequisites for service on a panchayat, although 
some sort of “respectability” was often referred to.  Thus, Chaplin noted 
that the members of panchayats were comprised of “respectable ryots, 
merchants, persons out of employ living upon their means or others who 
were supposed capable of the duty,” while Grant described them as “the 
more intelligent villagers,” and noted “outcastes and any low castes were 
excluded.”27  Yet Pottinger also reported, “there was no rule or even 
established custom on this point.  In general disputants selected their friends 
of whatever rank they might be.”28  Thus, British officials later thought it 
necessary to decide whether eligibility requirements should apply to the 
members of panchayats.  In this, they subsequently accepted what they 
believed was customary practice.  They determined that service on the 
panchayat was to be open to all adult males and that the litigants were to be 
free to select their own representatives. 
The number of people who would serve on a panchayat was also open 
to question.  The term “panchayat” is derived from the Hindi word “panch,” 
or “five.”  The prevailing notion was that, under the Marathas, two 
representatives were selected by each litigant  while a presiding fifth 
member, the sarpanch, directed the proceedings and represented the state.29  
Thus, it was reported that in petty matters the village clerk (karkun) would 
often serve as sarpanch, while in more significant ones the Maratha district 
officer (mamledar) might do so.30  However, it is quite clear that this 
number could vary widely.31  Some panchayats, as Briggs suggested, 
comprised all the male elders of the village.32  Elsewhere, in an important 
inheritance case heard under British authority in 1819, there were seven 
members of the panchayat.33  William Charmier, an Assistant Judge at 
Dindori, explained, “there is a notion that a punchaiet always consisted of 
five persons which as far as I can ascertain does not appear to be the case.  
When first instituted it most probably was so but that such has been the case 
 
26 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 65, 66. 
27 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 63, 65. 
28 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 66. 
29 FRANKS, supra note 17, at 15. 
30 Id. at 14, 15. 
31 Id. 
32 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 64. 
33 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, CIVIL JUDICATURE, Minute on the Proceeding of Captain Robertson 
and Mr. Lumsden on Their Award in the Disputed Claim of Luximon Row Sadasew and Mulhar Row 
Appa (July 7, 1821), in EAST INDIA COMPANY PAPERS: MUNKESHUR’S APPEAL 10/10 (Maharashtra 
State Archives). 
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latterly I mean for many years, I can no where find out.”34  British officials 
therefore eventually found it necessary to regularize both the size of the 
panchayat and the position of sarpanch when integrating the panchayat into 
their system of judicial administration. 
British officials perhaps welcomed the fact that panchayat justice was 
often encumbered by a significant amount of documentation, something 
they found recognizable although not necessarily entirely comprehensible.  
Perhaps inevitably, therefore, panchayat procedural documents soon 
became equated to their supposed British cognates and thus integrated into 
the British system of justice.  The razeenamah, for example, which 
Elphinstone explained as the “consent of the parties to the arbitration” by 
panchayat, soon enough became understood as equivalent to an English 
“bond,” legally binding the litigants to accept the award of an arbitrator.35  
Other forms of documentation bore a much closer resemblance to English 
legal forms and thus were also readily assimilated.  The sarounsh, for 
example, an abstract of the panchayat’s decision, was easily adopted as 
equivalent to an English arbitrator’s “award.” 
Enforcement was perhaps the final area of panchayat justice that the 
British sought to reform and regularize.  Chaplin reported that the 
enforcement of a panchayat’s decision was often the responsibility of 
various officials, including the village accountant, district officer, or village 
watchman.36  However, Pottinger indicated that enforcement could also be 
executed by “personal authority.”37  He was undoubtedly referring to the 
practice of tukaza, a term one mid-nineteenth-century dictionary defines as 
“dunning” or “exacting.”38  It is fair to say that British officials sometimes 
were appalled by the practice, which came in a variety of forms.  
Elphinstone explained that tukaza included “every thing from simple 
importunity up to placing a guard over a man, preventing his eating, tying 
him neck and heels, or making him stand on one leg, with a heavy stone on 
his head, under a vertical sun.”39  Chaplin argued that tukaza often 
amounted “to a degree of torture.”40 
However, there was disagreement among British officials as to 
 
34 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, William Charmier, Assistant Judge, Dindoree, to Saville Marriot 
(Apr. 24, 1827), in EAST INDIA COMPANY PAPERS: ANNUAL AND PERIODICAL REPORTS 1/127 
(Maharashtra State Archives). 
35 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 59, 74. 
36 Id. at 65.   
37 Id. at 67.   
38 CHARLES PHILIP BROWN, THE ZILLAH DICTIONARY, IN THE ROMAN CHARACTER: 
EXPLAINING THE VARIOUS WORDS USED IN BUSINESS IN INDIA 120 (1852).  ELPHINSTONE also defined 
tukaza as “dunning” in REPORT ON THE TERRITORIES CONQUERED FROM THE PAISHWA, at 64 (1821). 
39 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 64.  
40 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 65. 
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whether tukaza was intended to enforce a panchayat’s award or whether it 
was intended to forcefully encourage potential litigants to submit their 
dispute to a panchayat.  Ultimately, Elphinstone adopted the latter 
interpretation.  In his 1819 Circular on the use of panchayats, he wrote, “it 
is absolutely necessary to prohibit the use of force, but all restraints and 
inconveniences that depend on the point of honor ought to be allowed to 
remain” because “if done away entirely, the great principle which drives 
men to Punchauts, private arbitrations and voluntary compositions, is put an 
end to, and every creditor is compelled to come to Court.”41  Similarly, 
W.R. Morris, Captain Grant’s Assistant Political Agent, explained how the 
reformed tukaza system operated in Satara: 
Tukazza or Tukada as it is termed in this Country still continue to 
exist, although it is never carried to such lengths as it was under the 
former Government; during that period there were four different 
descriptions of it constantly practised; that of obliging a person to 
stand in the sun to perform the same with a heavy weight upon his 
head, or with one of his feet raised up; to seat a man at the door of his 
house and prevent him eating during the day, or to keep him confined 
in his house & oblige him to afford provision for the man who was 
seated at his door.  In order to abolish the two former of these, orders 
have been issued strictly forbidding any recourse to violence, for the 
purpose of effecting a settlement of debts, but any one is at liberty to 
try and enforce such arrangement by either of the two latter expedients 
which are generally put in practice for one or two days, after which the 
plaintiff comes and lays his complaint before the Mamletdar or the 
Nyadeish.42 
In Pune, on the other hand, tukaza was understood as a form of post-
conviction punishment.  There, imprisonment for debt had been a common 
practice under the Maratha government and continued to be so under the 
British.  In 1822, Chaplin reported, “no definite rules have been established 
in regards to the period of imprisonment for debt, if the debtor failed to 
satisfy the demand upon him, creditors requiring the confinement of debtors 
pay them subsistence.”43  H.D. Robertson, the Pune Collector, suggested 
however, that imprisonment was considered to be an alternative to tukaza.  
He wrote: 
 
41 Circular of the Honble the Commissioner, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOMBAY PROCEEDINGS 
1820-1829, IOR/P/398/71 (British Library). 
42 Replies to Supplemental Queries by Mr. Morris (No. 2), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOARD’S 
COLLECTIONS 1820S, IOR/F/4/839/22429 (British Library).  The nyadeish, more commonly spelled 
nyayadesh, was the chief justice minister under the Marathas. 
43 From the Commissioner in the Deccan (Aug. 20, 1822), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOMBAY 
REVENUE PROCEEDINGS, IOR/P/368/34 (British Library). 
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Tuggaza is not carried to excess, and many prefer placing their debtors 
under restraint in the Debtor’s Jail to resorting to it.  This is especially 
the case where the Debtor being rather respectable may be afraid of 
losing his character by being thrown into Prison, the threat of which 
frequently makes him pay his debt.44 
Nevertheless, the panchayats themselves possessed no direct power of 
enforcement.  Their decrees were implemented either through an 
individual’s “personal authority,” such as a tukaza, or the intervention of 
the state.45  In cases of debt, this involved the seizure and sale of property to 
fulfill the terms of the panchayat award.  In the Deccan, Chaplin noted, 
“decrees are executed in the usual manner by distraint of property and 
personal restraint, if necessary.  Houses are sometimes sold, but the 
implements of trades are usually, spared, unless no other property be forth 
coming.”46 
As British reforms of the panchayat proceeded, it sometimes became 
clear that attempts to restrict the use of tukaza adversely affected the poor’s 
access to justice.  In 1823, for example, the enforcement of panchayat 
awards was formally delegated to the civil magistrates (munsifs) and 
mamledars whose actions had to be authorized by the Collector.  However, 
the delay involved in getting that authorization, it was reported, often 
proved to be a hardship upon poorer litigants.  Without the threat of direct 
violent action, poor litigants often did not have the means to initiate a 
tukaza since, at the very least, this required the employment of a peon to 
stay outside the home of the debtor.  Tukaza, therefore, became a weapon of 
the rich against the poor.  Chaplin subsequently indicated that further 
regulation might be necessary to correct this unintended consequence.  “It is 
said,” he wrote, 
[T]hat those who have means of exercising Tugazar have pressed the 
execution of Decrees in their favor before the expiration of the period 
allowed for appealing.  It will require the Judges’ attention to correct 
these defects and abuses, but no sale of property should ever take place 
in my opinion without his previous sanction.  The appointment of 
persons specially responsible for the legal seizure and distraint of 
goods and chattels under Decrees of Court will perhaps be eventually 
necessary.47 
 
44 Extract from Revenue Consultations connected with the Commissioners report of the 10 
August 1822—not included in the Judicial Consultations, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOARD’S 
COLLECTIONS 1825-6, IOR/F/4/837/22427 (British Library). 
45 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 67. 
46 From the Commissioner in the Deccan, supra note 43. 
47 Papers of East India Company, Letter from William Chaplin to D. Greenhill (Dec. 14, 1825), 
in 1 ANNUAL AND PERIODICAL REPORTS (1826) (Maharashtra State Archives). 
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While the observations of Company officers were being solicited, 
Elphinstone also sought the advice of local Hindu law scholars (shastris) 
and undertook the investigation of panchayat practices under Ram Shastri 
Prabhune, the legendarily incorruptible chief justice (nyayadesh) of the 
Peshwas during the late eighteenth century.48  From these investigations, it 
is clear that the eighteenth-century panchayat also had been encumbered by 
many rules and therefore need not be romanticized as an informal 
community-based institution of dispute resolution.  The responses of three 
shastris survive.  Although the evidence does not make this precisely clear, 
it appears that these shastris were all from Pune and that one, or perhaps 
two, served under Ram Shastri.  Thus, the picture they present is one of the 
panchayat as it functioned in a courtly urban environment at the heart of the 
central administration of the Maratha government and not in the village 
community. 
Nevertheless, British officials, and Elphinstone in particular, valued 
these “authentic” sources as the foundation upon which to rebuild the 
panchayat system under British authority.  In the Report on the Territories 
Conquered from the Paishwa, Elphinstone explained that such historical 
research was necessary for a full understanding of the panchayat.  “The 
Punchayet,” he wrote, “may therefore be considered as the great instrument 
in the administration of Justice, and it is of consequence to determine how 
the assembly was constituted, what were its powers, and what its method of 
proceeding and enforcing, or procuring the enforcement of its decrees.”49  
Certainly, much of this historicist perspective can be attributed to the 
Orientalist perspective that several important Company officer-officials, 
including Elphinstone, brought to their work in India.50  This perspective 
necessitated an understanding of the ancient constitution of the country in 
order to revive it.  Thus while the observations of Elphinstone’s subordinate 
officials on the panchayat were important to the British, the remarks of the 
shastris were equally vital. 
The most extensive responses to the British investigation were those 
provided by Ragopunt Tutte who had served under Ram Shastri and also 
had provided information to Arthur Steele for his influential book, The Law 
and Custom of Hindoo Castes (1826).  Additional replies survive from two 
other shastris, Nukka Ram and Rumeshur, the latter of whom may also 
have served under Ram Shastri.51  Two of the three shastris agreed that 
 
48 Gune indicates that the panchayat “became the accepted principal of law” only during the 
mid-eighteenth century when the Peshwas came to control the Maratha government. See V.T. GUNE, 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE MARATHAS 47-50 (1953).  
49 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 76. 
50 MARTHA MCLAREN, BRITISH INDIA AND BRITISH SCOTLAND, 1780-1830: CAREER BUILDING. 
EMPIRE BUILDING, AND A SCOTTISH SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ON INDIAN GOVERNANCE (2001). 
51 The investigation into the practices during Ram Shastri’s time appears to have been 
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there were two types of panchayats: those that were convened by the 
government, and those that were organized within each caste or profession 
and independent of government interference.52  A third shastri, Nukka Ram, 
whose remarks were very brief and quite sketchy, only indicated that a local 
judicial official (amin) was present at all panchayats.53 
Both Ragopunt and Rumeshur remarked that convening a panchayat 
without government oversight often required the authority or influence of 
someone of substance.  Thus, Rumeshur noted, “Every man who [had] 
power enough to enforce the decision of a Punchaet could assemble one.”54  
However, personal influence was not absolutely necessary.  Without it, a 
government karkun might be assigned to assist the panchayat, especially to 
ensure the attendance of all those concerned in the suit.  Ragopunt 
explained that among bankers, 
[I]f there was no Banker of sufficient weight to assemble the 
Punchayet [illegible] & to make the Members & Witnesses attend 
them they met above the Sircar Houses & a Govt. Carcoon was 
appointed to do this for them.  This Carcoon though he sat with them 
had no voice in the Punchayet but was merely a link between it & the 
Govt.  He was the executive officer of the Punchayet in doing all that 
could not be done without the influence of a Govt. Officer in 
assembling Witnesses & Parties &c.  He might offer his advice but it 
was not incumbent on the Punchayet to receive it.55 
The shastris appeared to have had almost exclusive experience with 
government-sponsored panchayats, or at least provided the most details 
about them.  Government-sponsored panchayats were convened by the 
government itself, and a karkun appointed a guard to ensure the attendance 
 
undertaken by two of Elphinstone’s subordinates at Pune, Lieutenant Macleod and William Lumsden, 
and much of their findings were later incorporated into Elphinstone’s Report on the Territories 
Conquered from the Paishwa. See supra note 13. Macleod notes that two of the people he employed in 
his court (kachari) had also served under Ram Shastri. See Papers from Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
Lieutenant Macleod to Elphinstone, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE 
LETTERS REGARDING THE POWERS OF PATAILS AND PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 
(British Library).   
52 Papers from Montstuart Elphinstone, Queries on Punchaits and answers by Raggopunt Tuttee, 
in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE LETTERS REGARDING THE POWERS 
OF PATAILS AND PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 (British Library).   
53 Papers from Montstuart Elphinstone, Observations of Punchaets by Nukka Ram Pundit, in 
INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE LETTERS REGARDING THE POWERS OF 
PATAILS AND PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 (British Library).   
54 Papers from Montstuart Elphinstone, Rumeshurs Account of Punchait, in INDIA OFFICE 
RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE LETTERS REGARDING THE POWERS OF PATAILS AND 
PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 (British Library).   
55 Papers from Mountstuart Elphinstone, Queries on Punchaits and Answers by Raggopunt 
Tuttee, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE LETTERS REGARDING THE 
POWERS OF PATAILS AND PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 (British Library).  
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of the members, the litigants, and the witnesses.  Both Ragopunt and 
Rumeshur indicated that the government had the authority to imprison both 
the defendant and the witnesses if they did not respond to the panchayat’s 
order.  Ragopunt added that the government also had the authority to “place 
a Mahussul over the contumacious person.”56  This, like tukaza, involved 
placing one or more peons who had to be fed at the delinquent’s door.57 
The government also had extraordinary powers to convene panchayats.  
Ram Shastri, it was reported, authorized regional administrators (sirkars) 
and mamledars to hear cases and then put the evidence before a panchayat.  
The mamledar was not required to accept the panchayat’s verdict although 
he did have the authority to inquire further into the matter.  The government 
could also refer cases to karkuns; however, in these instances, the clerk 
acted more as an interested observer.  Rumeshur explained, “a Karkoon of 
Govt. often sat with a Punchait (for the purpose of influence) but he was 
never considered so much a member that he could not be excluded [from?] 
their sittings whenever the Punch wished to deliberate apart.”58 
In all government cases, the panchayat was composed of members 
selected separately to represent them by each of the litigants.  They also 
retained the right to object to the government’s appointees, which they 
apparently often did.  Nukka Ram noted, 
[T]he Govt. added such members [to the panchayat] as it thought 
proper and always had a Govt. Officer present who kept every thing in 
motion, and superintended & conducted generally the proceedings 
shaping and preparing the whole for the consideration of the members. 
The parties would object to every Member proposed by the Officers of 
Government, and on the other hand the Sirkar often rejected unworthy 
members proposed by either party.59 
The enforcement of panchayat decrees was also the responsibility of 
government and, once again, there were notable differences between the 
treatment of the rich and poor.  While the poor could be subject to 
imprisonment for refusing to abide by a panchayat’s award, the rich 
generally could not.  Rumeshur indicated that the first step taken to 
persuade a recalcitrant rich person to perform an award involved 
government officials “sitting in his house & demeaning him & sometimes 
keeping him from eating for three or four days.”60  In the cases of both rich 
and poor, however, the next step was to confiscate property, although there 
 
56 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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were certain limits.  The houses of neither the rich nor poor appear to have 
been subject to confiscation.  For a poor person, his tools or farm 
implements also were exempt.  “His effects . . . were sold,” Ragopunt said, 
“but with great consideration so as not to effect his entire ruin.”61  A rich 
person, on the other hand, appears to have had no such special exemption, 
Ragopunt noting that even his horses could be taken. 
British officials hoped to ensure that, under their administration, the 
panchayat would be resurrected as an efficient, accessible, and inexpensive 
system of justice.  Therefore, many questions sought to uncover existing 
problems that were believed to be hampering the efficiency of the 
panchayat system.  However, as we shall see, it was in the attempt to rectify 
these perceived problems that the British most seriously undermined their 
own admitted goal to rule by “the customs of the country.”62  Among the 
most common complaints expressed to Elphinstone was the dilatoriness of 
panchayat proceedings, the difficulty of securing members to serve, and the 
potential for bribery and other forms of corruption.  By 1819, Elphinstone 
had already distributed a Circular to his Collectors cautiously outlining the 
reforms that were necessary “to purify, and invigorate the native system.”63  
According to these orders, the jurisdiction of village panchayats was to be 
limited to cases valued at 150 Rupees or less; employment of professional 
pleaders (vakils) was prohibited; suits for debts had to be instituted within 
twelve years; and property suits within sixty years of the origination of the 
dispute.64  Elphinstone indicated that several further reforms might be 
necessary but withheld any decision for the time being. 
After 1819, the inefficiencies of the panchayat system of justice 
plagued the Collectors and other British judicial officials.  Ultimately, suits 
brought before panchayats formed only a fraction of the cases within the 
British system of justice.  Nevertheless, the correspondence from these 
officer-officials reveals an immense amount of frustration at being ordered 
to make the panchayat “the great instrument in the administration of 
Justice,” but, at the same time, to “clear the books” of their accumulating 
caseloads in the districts under their command.  Their chief complaint was 
the length of time it took for a panchayat to convene, hear a case, and reach 
a decision.  One example will suffice to illustrate the nature of these 
complaints, but there were a great many more like it.  George Giberne, the 
Register at Ahmednagar, explained to Henry Pottinger, the Collector, that 
 
61 Id. 
62 John Adam, Letter to Mountstuart Elphinstone, in POONA RESIDENCY CORRESPONDENCE, 
supra note 12, at 478. 
63 Circular of the Honorable Commissioner, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOMBAY PROCEEDINGS 
(1820-29) IOR/P/398/71 (British Library). 
64 Id. 
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the panchayat was, in theory, both “expeditious” and “beautiful.”65  In many 
ways, he suggested, it “may even be considered Superior to our far famed 
British Courts where the parties can only object to, not choose, their Jury, 
and on account of the variety of forms and intricate law questions, few men 
are capable of pleading their own causes.”66  However, the reality of the 
panchayat system was much different.  “It is now my intention,” he wrote, 
“to shew the difference between that beautiful theory and the present base 
practice.”  Giberne went on to explain: 
In the first place a person makes a complaint and shews good cause to 
have an investigation [made?] into his case, the Defendant argues the 
Plaintiff’s right and in short a Punchaiet is ordered; the parties give the 
necessary Security to abide by the decision, and write down the names 
of the members they select; they commence sitting upon [the?] 
question, but [now?] one day, half of the members will attend, the next 
day not so many, the day after very likely not one; and for several 
successive days, sometimes indeed weeks, nothing whatever will be 
accomplished; in this case what is to be done. The Custom is, to send a 
Peon to exhort them to attend, and this must be done four or five times 
a week, and even then the attendance is precarious.67 
British officers and officials further complained that it was also often 
difficult to find people who were willing to serve on a panchayat.  Many 
argued that too few people were willing to take the time away from their 
businesses or other personal pursuits, and this compounded the problem of 
delays and postponements.  Thus, Capt. Pottinger reported, 
[T]he Members [of a panchayat] usually consider it a tax on their time, 
and are careless as to the question before them unless they have an 
interest at stake either directly or indirectly.  In the latter event they are 
partial, and in the former they are inattentive, and occupy them selves 
[sic] with any thing else than that which should demand their whole 
thoughts.68 
As early as January 1819, Capt. Briggs in Khandesh requested the 
authority to pay the members of a panchayat in order to encourage 
participation.69  Elphinstone quickly refused the request noting that the 
payment of panchayat members “would take away the principal motive they 
 
65 Papers of East India Company, Letter from George Giberne to Captain Pottinger (Aug. 1, 
1822), in 9A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUDICATURE (1823) (Maharashtra State Archives). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Letter from Pottinger to Elphinstone (Oct. 29, 1818), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: 20 BENGAL 
POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, DECEMBER 12, 1818, IOR/P/121/28 (British Library). 
69 Letter from Briggs to Elphinstone (Jan. 20, 1819), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: 27 BENGAL 
POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, FEBRUARY 13, 1819, IOR/P/121/40 (British Library). 
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now have to use Dispatch.”70  However, Briggs continued to believe that 
such payments would improve the panchayat system.  Three years later, he 
was still lamenting, 
[A]t a very early period I perceived the great reluctance with which 
almost all persons attended Punchayuts excepting on occasions where 
Cast was concerned, and I accordingly recommended that an 
allowance should be granted to the members while sitting, but it was 
considered that it might be an encouragement to them to delay 
decision, and it was not authorized, and has therefore never been again 
agitated.71 
Among the most grievous complaints, however, were often those 
alleging bribery or corruption, and these grievances were very often 
suffused with racist condemnations of Indian culture and character.  Once 
again, one example here represents many others.  Capt. Pottinger, who 
otherwise might be considered a staunch advocate of the panchayat system, 
wrote in 1818: 
The system of receiving Bribes in adjusting all disputes was universal 
before the War, and has taken such deep root that nothing but time and 
the example of an upright and good Government will extirpate it.  I 
have been obliged to turn apparently respectable Brahmuns and 
Soukars ignominiously out of the Court, when it has been shown that 
they took a few Rupees from each of the Parties on whose cause I had 
requested them to sit.  On such occasions they have acted with great 
effrontery and showed no symptoms of remorse at their disgrace.  The 
better classes of our subjects, I am grieved to say seem to me to be 
deficient in almost every fine or honorable sentiment, and a total 
absence of a sense of shame is a marked deformity in their characters; 
My anxious and fullest endeavours have been, and are directed to 
reform this degraded state of the Native Society, and I trust my 
exertions will not be unavailing.72 
 
 
70 Id.  
71 Papers of East India Company, Judicial Department, Letter from Briggs to William Chaplin 
(May 3, 1822), in 9 CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUDICATURE (1822) (Maharashtra State Archives).  
Nevertheless, Briggs, who later became the Resident at Satara, remained a staunch advocate of the 
panchayat.  See BRIGGS, LETTERS ADDRESSED TO A YOUNG PERSON IN INDIA: CALCULATED TO AFFORD 
INSTRUCTION FOR HIS CONDUCT IN GENERAL, AND MORE ESPECIALLY IN HIS INTERCOURSE WITH THE 
NATIVES 176 (London, 1828) (stating, with regard to the panchayat, that “I can with truth assert, that it 
is a most simple, cheap, and efficient mode of administering justice, and is admirably calculated for a 
people situated as is the present state of Indian society.”). 
72 Letter from Pottinger to Elphinstone (Sept. 10, 1818), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: 49 BENGAL 
POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, OCTOBER 10, 1818, IOR/P/121/22 (British Library). 
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In the summer of 1822, H. D. Robertson, the Collector at Pune, sought 
further advice from the local shastris and amins as to how best to remedy 
the perceived ills of the panchayat system.  To do this, he employed the 
services of Harry Borradaile whose indefatigable labors produced both the 
Reports of the Civil Causes adjudged by the Court of Sudur Udalut for the 
Presidency of Bombay (1825), the first of its kind in western India, and the 
massive compilation of Gujarat Caste Rules, which would lay unpublished 
for more than half a century.  As was the case when Elphinstone sought the 
advice of the shastris in 1819, the Pune experience of the shastris and 
amins in 1822 was unlikely to have reflected panchayat practices outside of 
the city.  Yet, their testimony is most revealing for the fact that there was a 
general agreement among them that to be effective, the panchayat needed to 
become more systematized and regularized.  In a word, the panchayat 
needed to be bureaucratized.  One should be careful, however, to 
distinguish between whether the respondents had previously believed that 
panchayat reforms were essential, or whether, when asked, the 
interrogatories necessitated the articulation of both grievances and 
suggestions for reform that heretofore had lain dormant.  That is, the 
question remains as to whether the shastris and amins would have thought 
it necessary to recommend further reforms to the panchayat system if they 
had not been prompted to do so by British officials.  In this regard, unlike 
the extensive documentation of the complaints of British officers and 
judicial officials, there is no surviving evidence to suggest that either the 
shastris or the amins had previously proposed or demanded reform. 
Nevertheless, many of the panchayat reforms later adopted by 
Elphinstone reflect the suggestions collected by Borradaile.  The 
introduction of a variety of fines to ensure that panchayats functioned 
expeditiously was the most common recommendation.73  Wishnoo Kushen, 
a Pune amin, suggested fines be imposed upon either litigants or witnesses 
who delayed the panchayat’s proceedings.  He explained, 
[M]any Plaintiffs, after giving in their petition stay away for many 
days, and when they do reappear there is considerable delay from the 
Defendant, who refuses or puts off giving an answer; and there is delay 
on both sides in collecting all the papers, so that a considerable time 
elapses before the business is prepared to be laid before the Punchayet. 
It is recommended above all, however, that when all the papers are 
collected, and the list of evidence given in, that some penalty should 
be inforced [sic] both on Plaintiffs and Defendants and witnesses, who 
do not attend when wanted.74 
 
73 Mr. Morris, Replies to Supplemental Queries, supra note 42, at 16-42. 
74 Id. at 47-48. 
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Chintanum Leley, a shastri, further recommended that both parties be 
required to promise that their version of events is true “and that if found to 
be false they will submit to be fined.”75 
The imposition of time limits on panchayat proceedings was also 
frequently suggested or specifically recommended.  The amin Anunrow 
Pandooring submitted a variety of time restrictions depending upon the type 
of case being adjudicated.76  However, in no case was a panchayat to take 
longer than six weeks to come to a decision.77  Others were much less 
definite about the time restrictions that might be necessary.  Wishnoo 
indicated only, “I recommend strongly that the Punchayet should be bound 
to a particular time to decide in,”78 while Chintamun advocated that “when 
a suit is referred to a Punchayet, the Punchayet ought to be bound to settle it 
within a given time, otherwise the Suit to be rendered liable to be taken 
from before it, and referred by Government to any one person it may please 
to appoint.”79 
The variety of other recommendations for reform indicates further 
areas in which delays were experienced.  From Anunrow’s extensive set of 
suggestions we can infer that many hurdles had to be overcome even before 
a panchayat could begin to hear a dispute.  One problem might arise if only 
one of the litigants sought to refer their case to a panchayat while the other 
preferred a judge, and another if the parties could not agree upon the 
sarpanch of the panchayat.  In either case, Anunrow urged greater 
government intervention to resolve the deadlock leaving much of the 
ultimate authority in the hands of the regional sirkar.80 
A still further delay might be caused by the failure to secure the 
attendance of the defendant before the panchayat.  Anunrow recommended 
the employment of sepoys to deliver written summonses to defendants who 
would then be provided with a receipt noting the time and date of their 
appearance.  In the event that the defendant was able to avoid being served 
or the sepoy accepted a bribe to report that the defendant could not be 
found, then “either fining him or letting judgment go against him would be 
 
75 Id. at 44-45.  Chintamun used the term khutbee to refer to this guarantee of the truth.  Khutbe, 
as it usually is transposed, is more commonly translated from the Arabic as “prayer,” but I have not been 
able to find a suitable definition that indicates its use in colonial India as a legal or judicial term.  
Reverend Joseph Wolff, who sought to convert the Jews of Palestine and Syria, however, defines it as a 
material engagement “promise” as reflected in the early nineteenth-century Missionary Journal of the 
Rev. Joseph Wolff.  I have therefore adapted this usage of the term.  See 2 JOSEPH WOLFF, MISSIONARY 
JOURNAL AND MEMOIR OF THE REV. JOSEPH WOLFF 197 (New York, E. Bliss and M. White, 1824). 
76 Mr. Morris, Replies to Supplemental Queries, supra note 42, at 60-64. 
77 Id. at 69-71. 
78 Id. at 48-49. 
79 Id. at 44-45, 48-49. 
80 Id. at 60-64. 
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easy and justifiable.”81  Similarly, recommendations were made to remedy 
the perceived problem of frivolous litigation, that is, the practice whereby 
litigants applied for a panchayat only in order to prolong judicial 
proceedings and delay judgment.82  Wishnoo, an amin himself, therefore 
suggested that amins should be authorized to proceed by summary 
judgment in suits whenever “the justice of litigiousness . . . is clear.”83 
Finally, Anunrow proposed that panchayat meetings be held only at 
the courthouse (cutcherry) “to act as a check against evasion.”84  Otherwise, 
he noted: 
[I]f the Plaintiff of Defendant are asked any questions by the 
Punchayet they will not give direct or proper answers; one says he will 
tomorrow, and in this manner procrastinate; the Plaintiff and defendant 
occasionally absent themselves altogether and a Punchayet entirely 
composed of persons not in the employment of Government, has no 
power over them: Punchayets should therefore sit where the Aumeen 
is, instead of in the Bazar [sic] or purgunnah where he cannot be to 
give them instructions; if the Punchayet sits in presence of the Sircar 
and any hindrance takes place, an order can be readily given and the 
Punchayet will not be delayed.85 
Therefore, in almost all instances, the Pune judicial and resident legal 
experts recommended greater government scrutiny, greater government 
supervision, and greater government interference in order to ensure the 
efficacy of panchayats.  Perhaps this should have been expected.  These 
were, after all, government-appointed judicial officers and high-ranking 
legal scholars, most of whom had previously served the Peshwa.86  
However, their view from the top coincided to an extraordinary degree with 
the perspective of the leading officer-officials of the British occupation.87  
Thus it should not be surprising to discover that a great many of the 
recommendations proposed by the shastris and amins found their way into 
British judicial policy. 
By January 1823, Elphinstone had become convinced that further and 
much more significant reforms of the panchayat were needed.  Writing from 
the field, he reluctantly admitted that the panchayat had failed to live up to 
his expectations and instead had exhibited all of the potential weaknesses he 
 
81 Id.  at 69-71. 
82 Id. at 45-46 (statement by Kuchoo Appajee, an amin). 
83 Id. at 48-49. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 66-67. 
86 Id. at 16-17. 
87 Extract of a Minute by the Governor (January 14, 1823), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOARD’S 
COLLECTIONS, supra note 41, at 11A-13A. 
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had warned of in his Report on the Territories Conquered from the 
Paishwa.  “The Judicial arrangements, I am sorry to say, have not been so 
successful as the Revenue,” Elphinstone wrote: 
Few causes have been decided, and those with considerable delay and 
dissatisfaction to all concerned. . . . The Punchayet on which so much 
depends under the Native System, has shewn all the inconveniences 
ascribed to it in my report of 1819, while the remedies applied to them 
have been less efficacious than was then expected.88 
He remained convinced, however, that the problems could not be 
solved by more intensive British supervision or more extensive 
intervention.  Like Munro, Elphinstone believed that Indian customs and 
practices lay beyond the comprehension of most British officials.  “It is 
indeed one of the great inconveniences of the system of Punchayets,” he 
wrote: 
[T]hat it is so ill adapted to European Superintendence; the want of 
regularity in the proceedings of Punchayets make them difficult to 
revise; their decisions being founded on traditional maxims are not 
easily understood by a foreigner; no European improvements can be 
grafted on a traditionary [sic] body of law, and no hope can be 
entertained in such circumstances of ever framing a simple Code, alike 
intelligible to the Judge and to the people.89 
Elphinstone concluded, therefore, that a greater number of Indian civil 
magistrates (munsifs) with summary jurisdiction needed to be employed and 
that a stricter set of rules was required for panchayats.  He summarized the 
plan that would be adopted later in the year: 
The principal features in the plan are, that the number of Moonsifs is 
encreased; that the Moonsifs are empowered to try all causes, not 
specially excepted, without obtaining the previous consent of both 
parties; that Punchayets are confined to particular classes of causes, 
unless when both parties desire that mode of trial; that the Members of 
Punchayets are named from a rotation list, when they cannot otherwise 
be procured; that it is obligatory to serve on Punchayets; that greater 
strictness and regularity of proceeding is introduced, and greater 
facilities given to appeals both from Moonsifs & Punchayets.90 
The 1823 reforms therefore restricted the original jurisdiction of 
panchayats to ten specific classes of suits, including those regarding local 
customs and privileges, marriage, maintenance, partition of property, “old 
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and intricate” accounts, and disputes involving less than fifty Rupees.91  
Thus, the panchayat’s authority was limited generally to administering 
family disputes, small debts, and questions of local customs.  Even in this 
much more limited sphere of action, litigants were not required to initiate 
their cases before a local panchayat.92  Instead, if they preferred to do so, 
they could submit a written request to have their case heard by one of the 
new munsifs.93  The responsibility for hearing suits concerning larger debts 
and property disputes, except those regarding village boundaries, also 
shifted to the civil magistrates and district officers, both of whom were also 
authorized to convene panchayats if they deemed it necessary.94  However, 
ultimate authority was reserved for the Collector.  No panchayat award 
could be executed without his authorization.95 
The new rules did not so much displace the panchayat as the principal 
locus of justice as to restrict its independence, limit its jurisdiction, and 
regularize its procedures within the administrative structure of the British 
judiciary.  In the courts of the mamledars and munsifs, for example, 
panchayats were restricted to no more than five members.96  The sarpanch 
was to be jointly selected by the litigants, but, if they could not agree, then 
one was to be appointed for them.  Litigants were required to sign both a 
razeenamah, now interpreted as an “arbitration deed,” as well as a “penalty 
bond,”97 the latter of which subjected the plaintiff to a maximum fine of ten 
percent of the value of the claim, if they failed “to substantiate their 
allegations.”98  This fine was intended to prevent frivolous litigation.  In one 
sense, such a fine was not altogether new, but it is another example of the 
extraordinary ways in which customary procedures were constantly being 
redefined for contemporary ends.  Under the Peshwa’s government, such 
fines, called goonhangari, had been levied as a penalty upon the party who 
lost their cause.  Here, however, the British shifted the burden entirely onto 
the plaintiff who became solely subject to the potential fine in order to 
inhibit litigation. 
 
91 Papers of East India Company, Judicial Department, 6 RULES RESPECTING PUNCHAYETS 94-
98 (1829) (Maharashtra State Archives). The ten categories were: religion, marriage, peculiar customs of 
places, hereditary estates (watans) and privileges (huks), division of property, maintenance, old and 
intricate accounts, disputes between two inhabitants of the same village for personal property worth less 
than fifty Rupees, personal injuries or other personal damages, and boundary disputes.  A reliable 
overview of the administrative changes in the panchayat system under British rule in the Deccan is 
provided by SINGH, supra note 5, at ch. 5. 
92 See generally Judicial Dep’t, supra note 91.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
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Further restrictions were placed upon the panchayat intended to 
routinize their proceedings.  Panchayat deliberations were limited to three 
months, after which both parties had to agree in writing to an extension.99  
If they could not agree, the case was then sent before the Collector or a 
British magistrate for summary justice.100  Panchayat members were to be 
drawn from among “respectable people of the class or degree of the 
parties.”101  However, if no one was willing to volunteer their services, then 
rotation lists were to be created of respectable people, such as the hereditary 
police and revenue officers (desmukhs), hereditary revenue accountants 
(despandes), and other hereditary landholders.102  Those who refused to 
serve when called upon became subject to a fine of up to five Rupees.103  If 
witnesses or litigants failed to appear upon the summons of a panchayat, 
they became subject to fines of two Rupees.104  Plaintiffs who continued to 
fail to appear could be non-suited with costs while a defendant’s failure to 
appear could result in the panchayat proceeding ex parte.105 
It should be clear, therefore, that rather than reviving the panchayat 
according to the customs of the country, what had developed within the 
space of five years was largely a hybrid of British arbitration practices and 
British law-court procedures that was called a “panchayat.”  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this does not appear to have been apparent to even its most 
ardent advocates.  Elphinstone himself did not find it paradoxical that in his 
Report on the Territories Conquered from the Paishwa he recommended 
both that the panchayat “must continue to be exempt from all new forms, 
interference and regulation on our part” and, at the same time, that action 
needed to be taken “to remove [the panchayat’s] abuses and revive its 
energy.”106  He appears to have believed that changes in “the mere 
administration of the law” could only improve, and not radically alter, the 
panchayat.107  Similarly, William Chaplin, Elphinstone’s successor, as 
Commissioner of the Deccan and also a keen proponent of the panchayat 
system, noted, “it is obvious that if left to work spontaneously, without a 
well regulated authority to stimulate them to action, they can be of very 
little utility as Engines of Justice.”108  However, it does not appear that 
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either Elphinstone or Chaplin understood that the imposition of a “well 
regulated authority” would inevitably reshape the form and function of the 
panchayat system. 
Ironically, one of the few instances in which this inherent contradiction 
in panchayat policy was recognized came from the East India Company’s 
Judicial Department in London.  Their observations are worth quoting at 
length for they emphasize the logical flaw in attempting to incorporate what 
was assumed to be a voluntary system of dispute resolution into a formal 
system of judicature.  Unfortunately for the Bombay Presidency, the 
relevant passage quoted here was later excised from the Department’s final 
version of the dispatch: 
Suits in which the parties can be persuaded to agree may be 
conveniently determined by arbitration, and if the Punchayet were 
restricted to this, which no doubt was its original function, it would 
perfectly answer the purpose, and would still be regarded with 
affection by the Natives, but the great mass of litigation consists of 
cases in which the enforcement of a claim is peremptorily insisted on 
by one party or pertinaciously resisted by another.  For the decision of 
all such Suits, whatever the subject of the claim may be, there should 
be regular Courts, freely accessible to the people and subject to 
safeguards for the due observance of the Law.  Till these are 
established there is no general protection. To refuse their aid to a 
Suitor, sending him to arbitration against his will, is to deny him 
justice. 
The objects of arbitration and those of Judicature are so essentially 
different, and the means best adapted to the one are so ill calculated for 
the other, that every attempt to assimilate them must be impracticable. 
The superintending and regulating of Punchayets by Officers of 
Government, are represented as necessary to their success, but, by the 
interference of authority, these bodies are rendered unfit for arbitration 
without being made fit for judicature.109 
The 1823 reforms did little to improve the efficiency of the panchayat 
or to reduce the backlog of cases in the British courts of justice and, by 
1827, the panchayat experiment in the Bombay Presidency had been 
deemed a failure.  Between 1819 and 1827, less than five percent of all 
cases in the Presidency were adjudicated before a panchayat.110  Therefore, 
the new Elphinstone Code of 1827 relegated the panchayat to a marginal 
 
109 Papers of East India Company, Judicial Department, Administration of Justice in the Deccan, 
in BOMBAY DISPATCHES, 486-89, IOR/E/4/1047 (1827) (British Library). 
110 Calculations based on surviving data in the Annual and Periodical Reports in the Company’s 
Civil Judicature files are preserved in the Maharashtra State Archives and supplemented by reports 
surviving in the Bombay Judicial Consultations files at the British Library. 
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and very subsidiary role as an aid to British judges who might or might not 
seek their advice.  In a rare moment of reflection, Elphinstone appeared to 
regret the fact that the entire superstructure of British governance in India 
was tending to destroy what he believed to be the traditional village 
community.  “The native system,” he wrote shortly before he retired as 
Governor, 
may long be tried with success in a moderate portion of an extensive 
Government at a distance from the Presidency and out of the 
neighbourhood of a supreme Court, but in a country situated like ours 
in the Deckan, it is in vain to attempt to preserve that system 
unimpaired. 
The first effect of the introduction of forms and the divisions of 
authority, is, I think, very unfavorable to the natives.  They have no 
longer any head to look up to.  Each person being charged with a 
Department, no one looks after the whole, and it is only in the duties 
connected with Justice, Revenue or Police that our functionaries come 
in contact with any class of the Natives.  The effect of these 
circumstances is already observable in the Deckan.  The intercourse 
between those of the higher orders and Europeans is already much less 
than it used to be and will probably diminish with every new arrival.111 
Whether the local, voluntary, and informal panchayat that the British 
imagined had been characteristic of India’s ancient constitution could ever 
have been made an effective tool for the dispensation of justice is a moot 
albeit highly contentious point.  It is clear though that British attempts to 
“revive” and “purify” the panchayat to serve their judicial administration 
made it increasingly less flexible and bound by an increasingly more 
complex set of procedural rules, all of which were based upon the 
assumption that Indians preferred to settle disputes through some form of a 
community-based arbitration forum rather than seek a winner-take-all 
decision in the British courts.  This is not to say that access to justice was 
better or worse under the new British-style panchayat or that substantive 
justice was better or worse served by these changes.  It is to say, however, 
that the British attempts to resuscitate the imagined ancient panchayat 
inevitably killed the patient. 
Once again, the Company’s Court of Directors in London understood 
this inherent contradiction although their imagining of the panchayat was 
based wholly upon their preconception of the Maratha system of justice as 
well as their own understanding of English legal custom and practices.  As 
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the failure of Elphinstone’s panchayat experiment increasingly became 
apparent, they wrote of “the true and correct idea of the Punchayet.”112  
Under the Marathas, they explained, people preferred to avoid the 
government’s courts: 
Not choosing to go before such imperfect tribunals, they had recourse 
to a plan of settling their disputes among themselves, the plan general 
throughout India, that of referring them to private arbitration. The 
whole of the proceeding was voluntary. The parties resorted to it by 
mutual agreement, and they had recourse to such Arbitrators as they 
could induce to undertake the arbitration. This was not an institution of 
the Government, it was an expedient of the people to supersede an 
institution of the Government which they could not trust, or to supply 
the place of one where it did not exist. It was to mistake the nature of 
this expedient of Individuals to make it an institution of Govt. and the 
attempt has accordingly failed.113 
 
 
112 See generally Administration of Justice in the Deccan, supra note 109.   
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paragraph from the final version of the dispatch. 
